In this paper, we study dynamic alliance formation among price setting agents in a competitive market. We look at n agents selling substitutable products competing (price) in a market. We defections by coalitions, i.e., each coalition considers the possibility that once it acts, another coalition may react, and a third coalition might in turn react, and so on. Thus, these two notions allow players to be farsighted (have varying degrees of foresight). In this paper, we: (i) predict the market structure as a function of the size (n) and degree of competition (substitutability); (ii) show the relationship between the LCS and the EPCF in our model; and (iii) demonstrate that the EPCF can provide a strict refinement of the LCS.
Introduction
Consider a marketplace where n distinct products are sold, each produced and sold by exactly one of n players. Though the products are differentiated, they are partial substitutes of each other. The n players compete in this marketplace by setting prices. Since products are partial substitutes, when any one player unilaterally increases (decreases) the selling price of his product, the demand for his product diminishes (increases) while the demand for the other n − 1 products increases (decreases). Examples of such marketplaces are numerous. They encompass several situations such as retail, fast food, car dealerships, markets for raw materials, including coal, ore, and oil, service goods, such as airline seats and hotel rooms, etc.
In several such instances, individual price-setting players may benefit by pooling demand and forming alliances among themselves. The reasons for doing so are manifold. Some of them include savings resulting from increased efficiencies, increased revenues through pooled market share, and decreased costs due to risk-pooling.
Indeed, the idea of price-setting cartels, though legally controversial, is very old. Cartels have been a feature of American business conduct for over 125 years. As early as 1879, when railroad carriers were privatized, price-setting coalitions were organized that set prices for transport between Chicago and the East Coast. For the last 75 years or so, cartels, coalitions, and mergers have come under the increased scrutiny of governments in various countries. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and subsequent refinements prohibit price-setting firms that compete in a market place to collude and set prices. However, several exceptions to this rule exist and continue to flourish in today's marketplace.
The first allowed exception was due to the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, which till today has mostly remained unchanged. Prior to 1922, farmers who attempted to work together to set prices and market their crops were in danger of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Capper-Volstead Act proposed "to give to the farmer the same right to bargain collectively that is already enjoyed by corporations." (62 Cong. Rec. 2057 , 1922 Intended to enable smaller farmers to compete with larger agribusinesses by forming cooperatives that were exempt from antitrust laws, it permitted cooperatives like Ocean Spray, Sunkist and Land O'Lakes to grow and prosper. The drafters of the act intended to provide the antitrust exemption only to farmers and the "people who produce farm products of all kinds." (Cong. Rec. 2052 Rec. , 1922 . It was intended to cover producers, not processors, and gave them the right to enjoy the benefits of size already enjoyed by agribusiness. However, under the protection of this act, several producers, processors, and sellers form price-setting coalitions and cooperatives. In the United States, statutes pertaining to cooperative incorporation vary by state. On one hand, North Dakota's statues are very broad and practically allow the formation of cooperatives in any business. On the other hand, several other states have stricter statutes that restrict cooperatives and price-setting coalitions to form only in agricultural sectors. (See for instance http://www.marketplaceofideas.com/). Thus, legally formed cooperatives can set prices of the member produced goods without the fear of invoking anti-trust scrutiny. Indeed, the famous National Cranberry Cooperative case indicates that 90% of all cranberry products are controlled by various price-setting coalitions of producers and processors. Other examples of such industries include dairy cooperatives (Cabot dairy coop., Vermont; Land O'Lakes), tobacco supplier and producer cartels, wine sellers' cooperatives, coffee seller cooperatives, pecans, rice, and wheat cooperatives, etc.
Price-setting coalitions pervade across industries other than agri-business and dairy. Indeed, the most famous cartel is probably the OPEC, and numerous other such international producer cartels exist. In the United States, one of the earliest such instances was the formation of the Appalachian Coals Inc. Competing producers of bituminous coal formed this corporation to act as their selling agent, with authority to set the prices. This coalition controlled over 70% of all coal production and sales in their immediate region. The Supreme court found in favor of the coal cartel and declared that though a violation of the Sherman act, it was not clear if the coal industry suffered due to the formation of this coalition. (See 288 U. S. 344, 1933) . Thus, this cartel was declared legal. Other examples include the Southwestern Public Service, a utility company that serves New Mexico and Texas, which is a price-setting cooperative of utility providers. Examples from other sectors include supplier coalitions that set raw bauxite prices (see, for instance, Pindyck, 1977) , fishery, and sellers of organic and natural foods.
Price-setting coalitions are not unique to natural resource industries and agri-businesses. Examples of such alliances in other sectors include auto supplier coalitions that sell components to manufacturers, airline alliances (Lederman, 2003) (the collusion among domestic airline partners is tacit-they set prices on flight legs that operate between the same routes at different times, which can be thought of as two products that are partial substitutes), hotel and casino alliances (MGM Mirage partnership with Harrah's casino in Las Vegas resulting in agreements in pricing rooms and services), coalitions and mergers of auto dealerships (Wiliam Jack Plc., Volvo-Volkswagen dealerships: see for instance Forbes news wire 2003/06/02/; Car Max, a coalition of several dealerships in Michigan, which advertises a one price no hassle experience: Source AIADA), service networks, such as a coalition of physicians who charge pre-set fees for several basic services (mimeo. AMA testimony at the FTC health care competition workshop), and producer cooperatives that exist in various other sectors. In Japan, where anti-trust policies are very similar to the United States, the existence of Kashiwa Kai, a coalition of price-setting auto part suppliers, is well known. Another Japanese institution is the Nagano concrete cooperative, where competing concrete sellers formed a price-setting coalition to eliminate competition.
In this paper, our intent is not to explore the legal ramifications of cartel formation. From the several examples cited above, it is clear that mergers resulting in price-setting coalitions among agents selling substitutes in a marketplace are not uncommon. Thus, justifingly, we will abandon the use of the word "cartels" and henceforth speak of coalitions of players.
Our interest is in studying the structure of the coalitions that may arise, and thus the resulting market structure and prices, as a function of n, the number of players, and the level of substitution among the products. In what follows, we will try to explain our motivation, which is two-fold, to examine this issue.
First of all, from a theoretical perspective, it may seem reasonable to expect that when agents participate in a competitive market, it may be in their best interest to align together as a monopoly and extract the entire surplus (though this may be illegal). Thus barring legal constraints, one may be tempted to predict that in theory, the stable coalition outcome in such economic situations would be a grand coalition of all sellers. This may partially be motivated by a commonly held intuition that suggests that by forming coalitions, merging agents are better off than by going alone, due to, for instance, increased market power. In fact, in a perfectly competitive market this prediction is quite accurate. In a market where competition is perfect, i.e. the n goods are identical and perfect substitutes of each other, it is easy to demonstrate that the dominant strategy that the firms will pursue (if allowed) would be to join forces as one large coalition and imitate the actions of a monopolist. Indeed, it is well known in the economics literature that, under certain types of price competition, firms may be induced to form coalitions and set higher prices. However, it is interesting to note that this behavior is very sensitive to the type and degree of competition and structure of the of the demand curve (Roberts and Sonneschein, 1977; Friedman, 1983) . For an excellent reference in this topic, see Vives (2001) . However, a few non-cooperative economic models report exactly the opposite. Davidson and Deneckere (1984) , Salant et al. (1985) , and others show that in a Cournot kind of competition, forming coalitions may not be a desirable strategy for individual firms. Thus, the reasons for firms merging to form coalitions and the stability of such coalitions is not immediately clear. Moreover, in reality, markets may not see a perfect competition but rather segmented players. For instance, the products may be partial substitutes of each other. In fact, even in a commodity market, products are differentiated by several attributes (customer service, geographical distance, etc.) and are hence partial substitutes. In such scenarios, which include a variety of environments, it is not clear what kind of coalition structures the players will form and what the resulting prices would be.
D 'Aspermont et al. (1983) were the first to investigate the issue of stable coalitions in a competitive market. They consider a price leadership model in which firms have the option to join a cartel that behaves like a monopolist or remain in the fringe. Donsimoni et al. (1986) use an alternate model in which firms compete on quantity and examine related issues. Similar in spirit is the work by Thoron (1998) who uses the idea of coalition proof Nash equilibrium to establish when firms may join a coalition or remain alone in a competitive market. It is important to note that the aforementioned studies (a) use a static concept of stability, and (b) consider only a class of possible coalitions that players may form. Inherently, a static concept only considers one step deviations by a coalition from a status quo scenario, restricting the players to be myopic in their behavior. Moreover, exogenously restricting the possible coalition structures is certainly a limitation.
Our second motivation stems from evidence in real world competitive markets. Some of the examples mentioned above illustrate certain interesting features. The gross substitutability of concrete and the size of the concrete market saw rapid fluctuations in Japan. This resulted in the concrete cooperative facing several rocky years due to frequent defections by member firms (between 1990 and 1995, the member size fluctuated between one and eight), which ultimately led to its collapse in 1998. The
Cranberry market in the United States saw similar dynamics. The Wisconsin Cranberry alliance (1906) and several small sellers evolved into 135 sellers and then into 309 alliances by 1912. Today, 11 remain, with Ocean Spray being the largest. Krasner (1974) , in an empirical study, claims that price elasticities and other factors contribute to the overall instability of coalition formations among commodity producers in several sectors. Since coalitions set prices, alliance formation has a direct repercussion on wholesale prices charged to the retailers and, consequently, the final retail price as well. Thus, alliance formation affects the structure of the market, the nature of contracting between suppliers and retailers, and market prices. Several empirical studies bear evidence to this phenomena. Lass et al. (2001) examine the effects of alliance structures and the resulting retail prices of dairy products in the North Eastern Unites States. Nevo (2001) examines the evolution of retail prices and market power due to price collusion in the ready-to-eat cereal industry. Yet another instance is described in Gasmi et al. (1992) of the effects of collusive behavior in the soft drink market. Verboven (1997) suggests that a focal point event, such as the creation of a cooperative, can facilitate the evolution of tacit collusive pricing among various groups of players in a market.
Towards addressing the issues raised above, we analyze a market with n agents who each sell a product and compete by setting the final selling price. We capture the substitutability of the individual products through a demand formulation similar to McGuire and Staelin (1983) and Davidson and Deneckere (1984) . The price that the market observes (i.e. the price that each player sets) is determined by the Nash equilibrium and depends on the value of the substitution parameter.
To examine the issue of stable coalitions in a competitive market, we propose a two-stage game.
In the first stage, agents form coalitions. A coalition structure is a partition of the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Coalition members are firms merging and pooling demand. We impose the condition that individual coalition partners sign a binding agreement to charge the same market price. That is, every member in an alliance will set the same price. This assumption keeps the model tractable and is not unusual in the literature. Moreover, this assumption is consistent with some of the examples we have illustrated and, in particular, resonates with the philosophy of cooperatives and other price-setting alliances. In the second stage, different coalitions compete with each other by setting prices. The prices are determined by a noncooperative equilibrium, and determine the individual profits of the n firms. Thus, the profit of an individual firm depends on the coalition structure in the market, the coalition that it is a member of, and the prices set by individual coalitions. Using this framework, working backwards, we conjecture the characteristics of the stable outcomes in Stage 1. That is, we predict the stable coalition structure (i.e. the alliances in the market) and the resulting market prices thereof.
In analyzing this game, we want to lay special emphasis on the word "stability". As previously mentioned, in some of the examples, the market saw changes in coalition structures (through defections and regrouping) before some sort of stability was attained. It is our interest to include these dynamics in our analysis. Perhaps more importantly, the existing theoretical literature on coalitions in competitive markets assumes players are myopic and thus completely ignores this issue. Thus, we believe that incorporating a notion of stability that captures some of these dynamics is of theoretical importance and practical value. Towards this end, we use two different concepts: the farsighted stability concept resulting in the largest consistent set (LCS), proposed by Chwe (1994) , and the equilibrium process of coalition formation (EPCF), proposed by Konishi and Ray (2003) .
Thus, using the above framework, we are interested in answering the following questions: 3. From an arbitrary status quo, can one predict the patterns in the evolution of coalitions and the market price, i.e. probabilistically predict stable paths of evolution of coalition structures?
Our model has some notable aspects. Our model of competition in Stage 2 is very specific. One may be tempted to think that a specific model of competition is restrictive. However, note that, in modeling the formation of coalitions, we use a dynamic concept of stability. This allows us to incorporate the important idea that players, when forming alliances, make complex trade-offs, by taking into account possible future defections by other players (and themselves) from the then status quo outcome. For this analysis, we require properties (and closed form expressions) that arbitrary coalition structures exhibit. The specific nature of our competitive model allows us to develop these properties. Moreover, as will be seen, even with a very simple model in Stage 2, the payoffs to arbitrary coalitions involve very unwieldy expressions.
An important area of research in supply chain management is to study the role of co-opetition introduced by Brandenburg and Nalebuff (1997) . They introduce the concept of "Value net", in which competing players in a supply chain often cooperate. There have been a few papers in operations management which study the role of cooperation among competing agents using a cooperative game theoretic framework. Much of this type of work has been devoted to analyzing transshipment policies and profit sharing by competitors. Good examples are Anupindi, Bassok, and Zemel (2001) , Kemahlioglu Ziya and Bartholdi (2003) , and Granot and Sošić (2003) . Though our framework may have some philosophical similarities, our work is completely different, both in flavor and methodology. To our knowledge, there is almost no work in economics as well as supply chain management that does a robust analysis of alliance formation in competitive supply chains. The operations literature focuses on contracting and the structure of supply chain partners in the presence of competition. For a good review of the contracting literature and applications of game theory in suply chain management, see Cachon and Netessine (2003) . Ray et al. (2004) study some properties of supply chain structure in the presence of competition. Majumder and Srinivasan (2003) and Srinivasan and Majumder (2003) study the structure of supply chain networks in the presence of vertical price competition. In the marketing literature, Choi (1991) examines the effect of price competition on certain simple supply chains. None of these models analyze the formation of coalitions or their stability. In the operations literature, Granot and Sošić (2004) study a model in which three firms compete on prices where benefits due to alliance formation among the three agents are extraneously endowed. They predict the farsighted stable outcomes in this market. In our paper, benefits realized by a coalition are endogenous to the model. Nagarajan and Bassok (2003) use the farsighted notion to completely characterize the stable outcomes in supply chain in which players may form coalitions to possibly enhance their negotiation power. Though the benefits realized by a coalition are endogenous, their setting and reasons for forming coalitions are completely different from our work.
We do not claim that our model of coalition formation is extremely accurate in its power to capture market dynamics or in its ability to describe the tradeoffs that farsighted players actually consider before signing an agreement. In fact, with respect to point 3. above, evolutions of coalitions and market prices are significantly affected by legal issues and market conditions, which we do not capture in our model. However, we feel that it is very important to analytically account for players' foresight in decision making and its impact on supply chain and market structure. In this paper, we look at a very specific market. However, the basic frameork of coalition formation by players with foresight can be extended to other supply chains.
To summarize our results: We first demonstrate several interesting properties of the equilibrium in Stage 2. In stage 1, we completely characterize the market structure for n < 5. For general values of n, we provide a partial characterization and show the relationship between the two concepts of stability.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we introduce our model, while §3 analyzes the price-setting Stage 2. §4 briefly introduces, as stability criteria, the farsighted coalitional stability and the largest consistent set, and the dynamic equilibrium process of coalition formation, which are subsequently used in our analysis. In §5, we characterize some stable coalition structures.
In §6 we compare our results across the two notions of stability that we use. Further, we demonstrate some important relationships between the LCS and the EPCF for a more general class of competitive games. In §7 we provide two extensions of our model. First we look at a case when the demand faced by each player is both price sensitive and stochastic. Next, we analyze a simple case with non-symmetric players. We conclude in §8. All proofs are given in a technical Appendix.
The model
Suppose there are n retailers of substitutable products, and let α ∈ [0, ∞) denote the level of substitutability between products of any two retailers, i and j. Then, the demand for product i can be expressed as
Note that this model can easily be transformed to restrict substitutability level to interval [0, 1]. When n = 2, setting θ = α/(2 + α) leads to exactly the same model used by McGuire and Staelin (1983) .
For simplicity, we assume without loss of generality that the retailers' purchasing costs are normalized so that c i = 0. Under this assumption, i's profit can be written as
When each retailer optimizes his individual profit, it is easy to verify that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which each retailer charges
Stage 2: Price Setting by Coalitions
In this section, we analyze how a given coalition formation influences pricing decisions and profit realizations of players. We start by analyzing a model with a single coalition, and then continue with a more general case, wherein multiple coalitions may be formed.
Let us first introduce some notation from game theory. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all players. A subset S ⊆ N is called a coalition. The subset N = S of all players is referred to as the
Let Z denote the set of all possible coalition structures. We let Π Z i denote the profit obtained by a player i in coalition structure Z. Thus, Π N i denotes the profit of any player when the grand coalition is formed. We let |Z k | denote the size of the coalition Z k . We denote the equilibrium price charged by player i by p * i . Further, each player i has a von Neumann-Morgenstern payoff function u i : Z → IR. In this paper, we assume that players are risk neutral and u i (Z) = Π Z i . Clearly, some of these notations are incomplete as the prices set and profit realized by a player not only depends on the coalition structure, but also his individual membership. However, these notations will be made clear depending on the context.
General coalition structure
Suppose that the current status quo is the coalition structure Z = {Z 1 , . . . , Z l }, where each subset represents a coalition of retailers. We assume that every member of a coalition charges the same retail price. A simple illustrative example is a situation where in a city there are n gas stations, of which k are franchises of the same company. These k gas stations tacitly agree to set the same retail price in the market. If gasoline is substitutable across the n retailers, the k colluding players are in an alliance (coalition). As mentioned before, this assumption is consistent with the existing literature and the motivating examples.
Given an arbitrary status quo coalition structure, the demand faced by player i who belongs to the coalition Z k is naturally given by
Since there are l coalitions in the market, due to our assumption, every coalition simultaneously and non-cooperatively set their price. Observe (we state without proof) that whatever be the coalition structure, there is a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) in prices.
Lemma 1 Stage 2 of the game is well defined.
The NE in a market with l coalitions is obtained by solving the l best response curves, one for each coalition. In our model, this corresponds to solving l linear equations in l unknowns. It is easy to see that the corresponding system of equations has a unique solution. We now analyze some of the equilibrium properties in Stage 1. In particular, we characterize the equilibrium prices and the profit obtained by coalition members.
Our first result demonstrates that in any arbitrary coalition formation, members of the smallest coalition make the highest profit. This is not too surprising and fairly intuitive, as smaller coalitions benefit more by the positive externalities due to substitution.
To prove this result, we will also need the following very useful lemma, which states that smaller coalitions charge lower prices in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 Suppose that i ∈ Z k , j ∈ Z m , and
Note that if the entire market (each of the n product types) is owned by a single decision maker, his decision would be exactly that of the grand coalition. Observe that all the players in the grand coalition set the same retail price which maximizes their profits. Though competition may benefit some of the individual players, it is easy to see that the grand coalition profit is Pareto optimal. Thus, we state the following result without the proof.
Theorem 4 Let α > 0. The total profit generated by the grand coalition exceeds the total profit generated in any other coalition structure. That is, if Z = {Z 1 , . . . , Z l } is any coalition structure with at least two nonempty coalitions, then
Along the same lines, observe that, when a coalition member leaves the coalition, the profit of the remaining members decreases: let us denote by Z the original coalition structure, by Z the structure obtained when j ∈ Z k leaves the coalition, and by s ∈ Z k \ {j} an arbitrary coalition player. According to Proposition 2, j's profit in Z is larger than the profit of the remaining coalition members,
When all |Z k | members in Z select a price to maximize their profits, the total profit realized by all players is higher than the one realized when |Z k | − 1 members select their price independently of the
Now, (3) and (4) together imply Π Z s ≤ Π Z s . It should be clear that this comparison is made across two coalition structures which are essentially the same except for the coalition from which a member defected. This result is formalized in the following proposition, which we state without a proof.
Proposition 5 Suppose that j ∈ Z k leaves the coalition, changing the coalition structure to Z = {Z 1 , . . . , Z k \ {j}, {j}, . . . , Z l }. Then, the profit for members of the coalition Z k \ {j} decreases with respect to the profit realized in the coalition Z k .
Before we move onto analyzing further properties of the general coalition structure, we will now present some results on a certain simple coalition structures. This will serve two purposes. First, these results motivate the tradeoffs that a player faces when forming an alliance, and second, they are handy and will be used later in the proofs of stability.
Basic coalition structure
Assume that the set of all players, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, is partitioned so that k players form a coalition, C, while each of the remaining players acts independently. We denote this coalition structure by Z n k . Thus Z n 1 represents the outcome when all players act independently. Each player in the coalition charges the same price, p C , while independent players charge p k+1 , p k+2 , . . . , p n . Then, the demand faced by a player, i, is
while each independent retailer charges the same price,
hence p * C > p * C . A comparison of the coalition structure where no coalition is formed (i.e. all n players act independently) with a basic coalition structure leads to the following result.
Proposition 6
1. The prices set by both coalition members and noncoalition members is higher with respect to the case where all players act independently (i.e., no alliances are formed).
2. Equilibrium prices for both coalition members and noncoalition members increase with the size of the coalition.
3. When k > 1, noncoalition members generate larger profit than retailers participating in a coalition.
Profit for coalition members increases with the size of the coalition.
Notice that Proposition 6 implies that the lowest individual profit is realized when no coalition is formed, that is, when all players act independently. Thus, coalition formation benefits all players when compared to the situation where no alliances are formed. In general, as the number of coalitions increase, the total profit (i.e. the sum of the profits of all players) may decrease due to the effects of competition. However, individual coalitions may actually benefit. Thus, one way to articulate this trade-off for a player is the size of the total profit versus his allocation of this total pie. This is best illustrated by comparing item 3 in Proposition 6 above with Theorem 4. On one hand, Theorem 4 indicates that the grand coalition dominates every other outcome in terms of total profit. In fact, when substitutability is perfect, players will not have any incentive to deviate from this outcome.
However, when the substitution parameter is strictly finite, it may be that an individual player does better by competing against a large coalition of n − 1 players. That is, he may make more than Π N n where Π N represents the total profit of the grand coalition. In fact, when exactly two coalitions are formed (that is, N is partitioned into two sets), the following result holds.
Proposition 7 For any k ≤ (n − 1)/2, noncoalition members in the coalition structure Z n k realize lower profit than the coalition members in the coalition structure Z n n−1 .
Because the coalition members in Z n n−1 always realize lower profit than the members of the grand coalition, we can state the following corollary.
Corollary 8 For any k ≤ (n − 1)/2, noncoalition members in the coalition structure Z n k realize lower profit than the members of the grand coalition.
Several interesting facts emerge from our analysis thus far. First of all, we have Theorem 4 that indicates that the grand coalition maximizes the joint profits of all players. However, consequent results indicate that there is a strong possibility that a lone player may be better off by defecting. In fact, given any set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n ≥ 3, ∃α > 0 such that a player is better off competing against a coalition of the remaining n − 1 players than forming the grand coalition. This result follows from the continuity of the profit of the lone player as a function of α and can be easily demonstrated by taking α sufficiently small. Notice that if the current status quo outcome is Z = {1, 2, . . . , n − 1} ∪ {n}, repeating the same argument, for certain values of n and α one can show that it is in the immediate interest for a player to deviate from the coalition {1, 2, . . . , n − 1}. Thus, in general, it is not clear what a stable outcome would look like.
In the next section, we first motivate some background concepts on coalitional stability and then apply them to our model.
Stability Concepts
In this section we analyze the stability of retailer alliances. The concepts we adopt lies within the framework of cooperative game theory. Before we describe the exact methodology we adopt, we will briefly try to motivate our framework.
Game theoretical concepts of stability are usually static. In noncooperative strategic form games, the often used concept is the Nash equilibrium, which only considers deviations by individual players.
In our setting, we assume that all retailers (coalitions) can communicate among themselves and can join or leave alliances at their will. Thus we may expect that they will consider both unilateral and joint (multi-lateral) deviations from a given coalition structure. The strong Nash equilbirium (SNE) in strategic form games (Aumann, 1959 ) admits this extension. The coalition structure core (CSC) (Aumann and Dreze, 1974 ) is the cooperative analogue of the SNE. However, these solution concepts, along with the majority of solution concepts commonly used in the analysis of coalition structures stability including the core (Gillies, 1959) and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987) , share the same problem that afflicts all static concepts. This can be described as follows: Consider the model we analyzed in the previous section. Assume that the status quo position is the grand coalition of all players. We know that for certain parameter values, it is beneficial for a player to defect from the grand coalition. The existing static concepts will immediately conclude that the grand coalition is not stable. There are potentially two fundamental problems with this logic. First, does this mean that the outcome in which a player competes with a coalition of n − 1 players is stable? If not, why should we conclude that the move from the grand coalition will ever happen? Secondly, the static analysis does not check if a further defection from the outcome with the coalition of n − 1 players will occur. Indeed, we know that for certain parameter values, a second defection by a player may be anticipated.
In fact, it may possibly happen that an initial defection triggers a sequence of further defections which eventually leads to an outcome in which the defecting parties accrue a lower payoff than the status quo. If this were the case, farsighted players may not choose to defect in the first place and thus an outcome which we thought was possibly not stable, may actually be a candidate for stability! A static concept, by definition, does not handle such trade-offs.
A solution concept that allows players to consider multiple possible further deviations, and which considers deviations where subcoalitions of a deviating coalition may further deviate with players outside that coalition, is the largest consistent set, introduced by Chwe (1994) . It is defined below, and is used as a stability criterion in our analysis of stable alliance structures.
The largest consistent set (LCS)
Let us denote by ≺ i the players' strong preference relations, described as follows: for two coalition structures, Z 1 and
Denote by S the following relation: Z 1 S Z 2 if the coalition structure Z 2 is obtained when S deviates from the coalition structure Z 1 .
We say that Z 1 is directly dominated by Z 2 , denoted by Z 1 < Z 2 , if there exists an S such that Z 1 S Z 2 , and Z 1 ≺ S Z 2 . We say that Z 1 is indirectly dominated by Chwe (1994) proves the existence, uniqueness, and non-emptiness of the largest consistent set (LCS). Since every coalition considers the possibility that, once it reacts, another coalition may react, and then yet another, and so on, the LCS incorporates farsighted coalitional stability. The LCS describes all possible stable outcomes and has the merit of "ruling out with confidence". That is, if Z ∈ the LCS, Z cannot be stable. For a more detailed analysis of farsighted coalitional stability, see Chwe (1994) . Xue (1998) has refined Chwe's LCS by introducing the notion of perfect foresight. Finally, for a survey on coalition formation see Greenberg (1994) . Some applications of analysis of stability using Chwe's LCS criterion include Masuda, Suzuki, and Muto (2000) , Granot and Sošić (2004) , and Nagarajan and Bassok (2002) .
While Chwe establishes the existence of a LCS, a criticism of this solution concept is that it may be too inclusive. Konishi and Ray (2002) propose an alternate dynamic approach to stability of coalition structures, which they call the equilibrium process of coalition formation (EPCF), and establish a link between the LCS and the limit states of absorbing deterministic EPCFs. In the next two sections, we define and describe the EPCF and then point out the essential diferences between the LCS and the EPCF.
Equilibrium process of coalition formation (EPCF)
For each player, recall that Π Z i denotes player i's profit in the coalition structure Z, and let δ i denote his discount factor. Then, i's profit from a sequence of coalition structures {Z t } may be written as
Clearly, δ = 0 will correspond to myopic solution concepts, and being concerned with farsightedness, we are more interested in values of δ close to one.
A process of coalition formation (PCF) is a transition probability p :
A PCF p induces a value function v i for each player i, which represents the infinite horizon payoff to a player starting from any coalition structure Z under the Markov process p, and is the unique solution to the equation
. For a given coalition S, let F S (Z) denote the set of coalition structures achievable by a one-step coalitional move by S from Z. We say that S has a profitable move from
We say that S has a strictly profitable move from Z under p if there is
A move V is called efficient for S if there is no other move W for S such that v i (W, p) > v i (V, p) ∀i ∈ S. Now, we can define EPCF, as follows: a PCF is an equilibrium PCF if:
1. whenever p(Z, V) > 0 for some V = Z, then there is S such that V is a profitable and efficient move for S from Z, 2. if there is a strictly profitable move from Z, then p(Z, Z) = 0 and there is a strictly profitable and efficient move V with p(Z, V) > 0.
Thus, a deviation from one coalition structure to another occurs only all members of the deviating coalition agree to move and if no member of the deviating coalition can find a strictly better alternative coalition structure. In addition, the deviation from a coalition structure must occur if there is a strictly profitable move. Notice that this definition does not require that every strictly profitable move has a positive probability. Konishi and Ray (2002) show that there is an equilibrium process of coalition formation.
If p(Z, V) ∈ {0, 1} ∀Z, V, a PCF is called deterministic. A coalition structure Z is said to be absorbing if p(Z, Z) = 1, while a PCF is absorbing if, for every coalition structure V, there is some absorbing coalition structure Z such that p (k) (Z, V) > 0, where p (k) denotes the k-step transition probability. Konishi and Ray (2002) show that the set of all absorbing states, under all deterministic absorbing EPCFs, is a subset of the LCS. Thus, absorbing states may provide a refinement of the LCS.
For a more detailed analysis of EPCFs, see Konishi and Ray (2002) .
The LCS and the EPCF
When players form coalitions, they reach some kind of an agreement. In fact, one can think of a contract that is signed by players binding them to their affiliation. Indeed, even if there are no legal obstacles, defections and re-formations are costly. The LCS uses the logic that players take into account all possible defections by fellow players before agreeing on an outcome. Thus, if the n players are involved in some kind of a negotiation process which will eventually determine a mutually amicable outcome (a coalitional structure), the LCS takes into account the possible scenarios threats and counter threats involving defections and counter defections that the players will consider before signing a binding agreement.
The EPCF takes a completely different approach. It allows players to defect from any state and rewards them with a state dependent payoff. Thus at any stage, the coalitional outcomes are non-binding.
Individual players in a status quo coalitional structure can thus calculate the expected discounted rewards if the coalitional structures evolved along any sample path. The absorbing states of the EPCF (i.e. the stable outcomes) can be interpreted as ultimate states (i.e. coalitional structures) from which no further movements are likely. It is interesting to note that though the two approaches are completely different, the absorbing states of the EPCF may provide a refinement of the LCS.
One of our motivations for using these two very different approaches is to check the robustness of our results and provide some sort of validation for the predictions of stable outcomes.
Stage 1: Coalition Stability
In this section, we analyze coalitional stability for our model. We start with some special cases with a small number of players, and then extend the analysis to a more general case with an arbitrary number of players. Before we proceed, let us observe that in the grand coalition the optimal price charged by each player corresponds to the demand that he faces and equals p C = D C = A/2. Let us also hereafter denote a coalition member and a noncoalition member in a basic coalition structure by subscripts C andC, respectively. In addition, in a general coalition structure, we may distinguish coalitions by using a subscript describing the coalition size, C k , for k = |C k |.
Three players
Suppose n = 3. Then, there are three possible coalition structures: all players acting independently, which will be referred to as Z 3 1 , a coalition of two players, which will be referred to as Z 3 2 , and the coalition of all three players, referred to as Z 3 3 (= N ). It follows from Proposition 6 that Π Z 3 1 < Π
, and Π
C . We need to find the relationship between the profit an independent player makes in Z 3 2 and the profit he can make in the grand coalition. When a player is independent, while the other two players form a coalition, his price at optimality and the corresponding demand are given by (12+12α+2α 2 ) 2 ≥ 0, hence the profit in the grand coalition dominates the profit he can make in any other coalition structure,
C , or if we write it in terms of players' preferences,
The above analysis leads to the following result.
Proposition 9 When n = 3, the only stable coalition structure is the alliance of all players, the grand coalition Z 3 3 .
As we had mentioned before, the LCS is a weak notion of stability in that it seeks to be inclusive and conservative in its approach to rule out unstable coalitions. Thus, the above proposition is actually quite strong. In fact, when n = 3, we can compare the LCS with some other stability concepts. We have the following observation.
Observation 10 When n = 3, the grand coalition is the unique absorbing state of the EPCF, and is also the unique element of the coalition structure core (CSC) and the LCS.
Four players
Suppose n = 4. There are five possible coalition structures: all players acting independently, Z 4 1 , two players in a coalition, with the remaining two players acting independently, Z 4 2 , two two-players coalition, Z 4 2,2 , a three-player coalition, Z 4 3 , and the coalition of all players, Z 4 4 (= N ). It follows from Proposition 6 that Π Z 4 1 < Π Therefore, for α ≤ 1.2516,
, and
and for α > 1.864,
C , and
The following result stems from the above analysis. The proof is, in its nature, similar to that of Proposition 9, and is omitted due to space constraints. It can be obtained from the authors.
Proposition 11 When n = 4, the coalition structure with no alliances, Z 4 1 , and a coalition structure with an alliance of two players, Z 4 2 , are never stable. 1. If α > 1.864, the only stable coalition structure is the alliance of all players, the grand coalition Z 4 4 . 2. If 1.2516 < α ≤ 1.864, the coalition structure Z 4 3 , where an alliance of three players is formed, and the grand coalition, Z 4 4 , are stable. 3. If α ≤ 1.2516, the coalition structure Z 4 2,2 , where two alliances of two players are formed, the coalition structure Z 4 3 , where an alliance of three players is formed, and the grand coalition, Z 4 4 are all stable.
With four players, when α > 1.864 the LCS corresponds to the unique absorbing state predicted by the EPCF. However, the correspondence between the LCS, absorbing states, and elements of the CSC, which held for three players, cease to exist when α ≤ 1.864. The CSC for α ≤ 1.864 consists of the coalition structure Z 4 3 . The grand coalition does not belong to the CSC since a single player always benefits from a deviation, and all players in a structure with two two-player coalitions benefit by forming the grand coalition.
Next, in a dynamic framework, we will show that the grand coalition and four coalition structures of the form Z 4 3 are absorbing. First, let us define p as follows: {(123), 4} 3 {(12), 3, 4}, {(234), 1} 4 {(23), 1, 4}, {(134), 2} 1 {(34), 1, 2}, {(124), 3} 2 {(14), 2, 3}, and p(Z, Z 4 4 ) = 1 for all remaining coalition structures Z. We want to show that this is an EPCF with absorbing state at the grand coalition. It is easy to verify that players always benefit by deviating from any coalition structure which is not in the LCS. This is also true for Z 4 2,2 : since v(Z 4 4 , p) = Π
2,2 C > 0. Lastly, we need to show that player i has an incentive to deviate from {(ijk), l} to {(jk), i, l}, which is equivalent to
. It is easy to evaluate that the RHS of this inequality never exceeds 0.25.
Next, we want to construct a PCF which is an EPCF with absorbing state at {(123), 4}. For i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i = j = k = i, let us define PCF as follows: {(1234)} 4 {(123), 4}, {(123), 4} {(123), 4}, {(ij4), k} 4 {(ij), k, 4}, {(ij), k, 4} 1,2,3 {(123), 4}, {(i4), j, k} 4 {1, 2, 3, 4}, {(ij), (k4)} 4 {(ij), k, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4} 1,2,3 {(123), 4}. Again, it is easy to verify that players always benefit by deviating from any coalition structure which is not in the LCS, and that player 4 benefits when he deviates from the grand coalition. Next, consider a coalition structure wherein 4 is a member of a three-player coalition, say {(124), 3}. We need to show that 4 has an incentive to deviate from {(124), 3}, which is equivalent to v 4 ({(124), 3}, p) ≤ Π Z 4 2 C + δv 4 ({(123), 4}, p). Thus, we must have
It is easy to evaluate that the RHS of this inequality never exceeds 0.25 when α ≤ 1.864. Similarly, 4
has an incentive to deviate from { (12)
. It is easy to evaluate that the RHS of this inequality never exceeds 0.18 when α ≤ 1.864. In a similar way, it can be shown that the remaining coalition structures of the form Z 4 3 are absorbing. We observe that whenever δ is reasonably farsighted, its value exceeds 0.25, and the dynamic approach reduces the set of stable outcomes by eliminating structures that contain two 2-player coalitions.
However, although we can refine the set of stable outcomes, a structure wherein one player deviates from the grand coalition remains stable. Thus, in the above examples, with the exception of the case α ≤ 1.2516, the EPCF does not succeed in providing a strict refinement of the LCS. In a later section, we will show that when n is "large" and the players are sufficiently foresighted, the EPCF indeed provides a strict refinement of the LCS.
n players
In this section, we consider an arbitrary number n of players. In § §5.3.1-5.3.3 we first develop some intermediate results, which are later used in §5.3.4, wherein we discuss stable coalition structures.
Coalition structure
In this section, we compare the profit of an independent retailer when a coalition of the remaining n − 1 retailers is formed, that is, in the structure Z n n−1 , and his profit when he participates in the grand coalition, Z n n . It is easy to evaluate that, for a noncoalition member,
, while for a coalition member,
, Therefore, the difference between his profits in these coalition structures can be written as
To determine when this difference is positive, let us first define a quadratic function G(α) = −9(n − 1)α 2 + 4n(n 2 − 4n + 1)α + 4n 2 (n − 3). This is a concave function that satisfies G(0) > 0. Thus, after determining its zeros, we can conclude that G(α) ≥ 0 for α ≤ 2n(n 2 − 4n + 1) + 2n (n 2 − 4n + 1) 2 + 9(n 2 − 4n + 3) 9(n − 1) ,
or, in other words, Π
C when (11) holds. The above analysis can be summarized in the following result.
Proposition 12 For any n ≥ 4, there is an α(n), defined by (11), such that for α ≤ α(n), a player realizes higher profit by staying independent and not joining the grand coalition.
It is easy to evaluate, as illustrated in Figure 1 , that the RHS of (11) increases in n fast: for n = 4, RHS = 1.864, for n = 5, RHS = 4.55, while for n = 10, RHS = 31.23. In fact, from the above proposition it follows that for α ≤ α(n), the grand coalition is not a member of the CSC. Suppose that n players are divided into two coalitions, one containing i players, C i , the other containing the remaining n − i players, C n−i . If we denote D(i, n − i) = 4n 2 (α + 1) + 3iα 2 (n − i), then the profit for a player who belongs to the coalition C i can be written as
Although i is a discrete variable, let us suppose for a moment that it is continuous, and consider partial derivatives of Π C i (n, i, α) with respect to i. The second partial derivative of Π C i (n, i, α) with respect to i corresponds to
One can evaluate that, for any n ≥ 2 and α > 0, the RHS of (12) is positive, hence Π C i (n, i, α) is convex in i. It follows from Theorem 4 that, whenever the independent player in Z n n−1 realize higher profit than he can generate in the grand coalition, each member of coalition C n−1 realizes a lower profit than the independent player, Π
for all i = 2, . . . , n − 1. We can summarize this analysis as follows.
Proposition 13 When the set of all players is divided into two coalitions, a player realizes the highest profit if he belongs to a one-member coalition.
Consider a coalition structure where players are divided into three coalitions, one containing n − k − 1 players, the other containing k players, and one having a single member. For this coalition structure, we can state the following result.
Proposition 14
In any coalition structure Z n n−k−1,k,1 that consists of three sets, one of which has only one member, a member of the largest coalition realizes lower profit than a coalition member in the coalition structure Z n n−1 .
The following corollary is straightforward.
Corollary 15
In any coalition structure Z n n−k−1,k,1 that consists of three sets, one of which has only one member, a member of the largest coalition realizes lower profit than a member of the grand coalition Z n n .
In Proposition 12 we had proved that for α ≤ α(n), a lone retailer will not myopically benefit from joining the larger coalition to form the grand coalition. Note that this does not preclude the fact that the grand coalition could still be farsighted stable. In what follows, we try to analyze situations in which members of two different coalitions will myopically benefit from joining together and possibly forming a grand coalition. This analysis is of interest by itself and will be used to prove several results in the next sections and help characterize the stable outcomes for large values of n. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 16 Let Z 1 = {Z 1 , . . . , Z m } and Z 2 = {Z 1 ∪ Z 2 , Z 3 . . . , Z m } be the status quo position and the new position in which two of the coalitions merge, respectively. Then ∀n, α > 0, we have
and ∃α * such that ∀α ≤ α * ,
The above proposition says that, in general, when two coalitions merge together (and all other coalitions remain unchanged), the total profits increase for the merging coalitions and the profit of the larger merging coalition is strictly more than the status quo. However, there is a threshold value of the substitution parameter which specifies when the smaller merging coalition benefits as well. Using the same technique in the proof, one can actually show that the remaining coalitions welcome any such mergers! Chwe (1994) demonstrates that, when the set of all outcomes is finite and when there are no infinite chains, the LCS has the external stability property with respect to indirect dominance. That is, at least one of the members of the LCS indirectly dominates an outcome not in the LCS. Note that such a result may not necessarily hold in our setting, as we have not demonstrated that infinite chains do not exist. However, using the above proposition, we can show the following property, which is useful in characterizing the general structure of the LCS for large values of n.
Proposition 17 For n large, every Y ∈ the LCS is indirectly dominated by either the grand coalition or a basic coalition structure.
Stable coalition structures
In this section, we use the results from § §5.3.1-5.3.3 to investigate stable coalition structures. As said in the introductory part of this paper, and knowing that the grand coalition realizes the highest profit compared to all other coalition structure, one may expect that the grand coalition is the only stable coalition structure. However, as we show below, for a range of values of the coefficient of substitutability, α, this is not the case.
Theorem 18
1. The grand coalition is always stable.
2. For n ≥ 3, there is an α(n), defined by (11), such that any coalition structure of the form Z n n−1 , which contains an n − 1-members coalition, is stable for α ≤ α(n).
3. For large n there are values α 1 , α 2 , α 1 < α 2 < α(n) such that: (a) when α < α 2 , the outcome Z n n−2,1,1 is stable; (b) when α < α 1 , the outcome Z n n−3,1,1,1 is stable.
Thus, while the grand coalition is always stable, with more than three players and the substitutability level low enough, there are other potentially stable coalition structures. As we have shown in §5.3.1, the substitutability level for which there is more than one stable structure increases fast with the number of players. In addition, although we show the results only for the coalition structure with two coalitions, one of which has a single member, as we have shown in §5.2, the number of potentially stable structures increases with the number of players and with the lower values of the coefficient of substitutability. In the above theorem, we demonstrate only up to the case with four possible coalitions. However, extending the results using the same proof technique involves tedious calculations and enumeration of multiple cases.
These results provide some value to a new comer to the market. As a result of Theorem 18, consider a following problem: a new retailer joins the market wherein all existing retailers belong to the grand coalition, and has to decide whether to join the coalition or not. As we have shown above, when the number of retailers is sufficiently large and the level of substitutability is below the threshold value defined by (11), his profit is larger if he remains independent, while the resulting coalition structure is still stable.
Refinements
In our analysis of stable outcomes, thus far, we were unsuccessful in ruling out the grand coalition. Our results using the LCS demonstrate that there are other possible stable outcomes other than the grand coalition. Indeed, in general, for large values of n, we are able to predict a pattern of stable coalition formations-the main story being that single defections are stable (in a dynamic sense) as n increases.
Note that the fact that the grand coalition is stable is not altogether obvious. Almost all myopic concepts will rule out the grand coalition with confidence, but the fact that players take into account future defections ensures that the grand coalition is actually a member of the LCS. However, one could argue that this may well be due to the fact that the LCS is very liberal in picking its candidates for stability.
Thus, we seek a refinement of the LCS for two reasons. First, from a theoretical perspective, refinements are always good. They provide a tighter concept of the existing version. Second, in our setting, we wish to validate our results -How robust are our results if we use a tighter concept?
As illustrated before, we use the EPCF to address this issue. Denote the set of absorbing states of an EPCF by EP (n, α). Konishi and Ray (2003) show that for large enough discount factors, the set of stable outcomes dictated by the EPCF (deterministic) is contained in the LCS. In fact, in our setting, using Proposition 13 and standard fixed point arguments we have the following result:
Theorem 19 For n large, ∃α > 0 such that the grand coalition is not a member of EP (n, α).
The above result shows that the grand coalition can be ruled out with confidence for certain values of the parameters in the model. This immediately gives a strict refinement of the LCS.
From our examples of coalitions that one observes in the market, stable coalitional structures often seem to involve one large coalition and a few very small coalitions or individual members. This result fits in nicely with that observation!
Extensions
In this section, we consider two possible extensions of our model -the stochastic case, and the nonsymmetric case.
The Stochastic Case
Another possible extension is to the case wherein the retailers face price sensitive stochastic demand.
We can extend our model to incorporate randomness by assuming that A in the demand is sampled from a compact interval, which represents an additive model of random demand. For a good review of stochastic and price dependent newsvendor problems, see Petruzzi and Dada (1999) .
When we speak of coalitions in the current setting, coalition partners set the same price and pool the demand, and thus buy the same quantity in expectation. As expected, pooling random variables complicates the analysis considerably. At this point, the only analysis that has been done is for the case with n = 3 retailers and when A is uniformly distributed. It can be shown that, in this case, the unique stable outcome is the grand coalition.
The Nonsymmetric Case
As shown in the previous section, when players are symmetric, the coalition of all players is not always the only stable coalition structure. In this section, we briefly review implications of considering nonsymmetric players on the stability of coalition structures. As we show below, when players are nonsymmetric, not only the grand coalition may be just one of several possible stable coalitions, but it may not be stable at all.
In §2, we introduce the model with an arbitrary number of symmetric players. When players are nonsymmetric, the model becomes much more complex. In order to maintain scalability and consistency of the model when some of the substitutability coefficients are zero, some additional constraints on substitutability coefficients need to be imposed. Granot and Sošić (2004) develop a model with three players of possibly substitutable products; we will use a simplified version of this model, wherein we assume that the costs for all retailers are normalized to zero. The model is an extension of the model introduced by McGuire and Staelin (1983) , and follows their notation.
Using the rescaled version of the model, the demands can be expressed as
where θ's represent the substitutability of two products. When θ ij = 0, products i and j have independent demands, and they become highly substitutable as θ ij → 1. Hereafter we assume that the use of notation i, j, k implies i = j = k = i. Notice that, if we assume symmetric players, θ 12 = θ 13 = θ 23 = θ, then (12) corresponds to (1) with n = 3, A = 1, and α = 3θ(2 − θ)/[2(1 − θ 2 )]. As shown in Granot and Sošić (2004) , the expressions for the retailers' optimal prices, without imposing any additional constraints on θs, can be quite complex. However, it is our purpose to investigate stability of the grand coalition when the retailers are nonsymmetric, so we will concentrate in our analysis on a few special cases.
As shown in §5.1, whenever the players are symmetric and θ > 0, the only stable coalition structure is the grand coalition. Let us now assume θ 12 = θ > 0, θ 13 = θ 23 = 0, that is, products 1 and 2 are substitutable, while 3 is not substitutable by neither 1 nor 2. Then,
It is easy to verify that in a two-retailer alliance containing player 3 and one of the players, 1 or 2, a unique price set by both retailers would decrease profits for both participating retailers, with at least one retailer making strictly less than what he can realize by acting independently. The same conclusion can be made for the alliance of all three retailers. However, as we have shown in §3, the alliance of players 1 and 2 would increase both of their profits, while the profit for retailer 3 remains unchanged. It is easy to verify that the only stable coalition structure is the alliance of retailers 1 and 2, {(12), 3}.
Next, suppose θ 12 = θ 13 = θ > 0, θ 23 = 0, that is, product 1 is substitutable by both 2 and 3 in a symmetric way, while 2 and 3 are not substitutable. Then,
Similar as above, it is easy to verify that in a two-retailer alliance containing player 1 and one of the players, 2 or 3, a unique price set by both retailers would decrease profits for both participating retailers, with at least one retailer making strictly less than what he can realize by acting independently.
The same conclusion can be made for the alliance of all three retailers. In addition, if a two-retailer alliance containing 1 and 2 is formed, the players select the same prices and realize the same profit as when they act independently. Thus, it is easy to verify that in this case we have two potentially stable structures: {1, 2, 3} and {1, (23)}.
Thus, it follows from the two simple cases described above that even with only three nonsymmetric retailers, the grand coalition is not likely to be stable. Since the two scenarios described above can be obtained with an arbitrary number n of players when we set the remaining n − 3 coefficients of substitutability to zero, we state the following theorem without a proof.
Theorem 20 With an arbitrary number, n, of nonsymmetric players, the grand coalition, in general, is not stable.
Concluding Remarks and Future Research
In this paper, we propose a simple model of competition in which retailers selling substitutable goods compete by setting prices. We show that in such markets, under certain conditions, retailers form price setting alliances among themselves. We characterize the equilibrium behavior of these alliances and demonstrate several myopic properties at equilibrium. For instance, we give conditions under which alliances may join together from a status quo position, when a coalition may choose to defect from a coalition, etc. We then proceed to perform a dynamic analysis of the coalition structure.
We provide complete characterizations for n < 5 and partially characterize the strcuture for general values of n (Theorem 18). In performing this analysis, we make several contributions to the existing literature. First, we provide a framework to analyze the market structure when players behave with foresight. We have provided several examples to motivate this very fact. Indeed, our model is very simplistic and real world examples are much more complicated. Alliances are formed for many reasons that our model does not account for. Risk pooling (we address this aspect with one example when n = 3), bargaining power, and extraneous benefits from multi-lateral agreements are some very important factors that we do not consider. However, even with such a simple model, the benefits of alliance formation and the dynamics of the evolution of coalitions are non-trivial to model. A possible tradeoff in analyzing this problem is whether to use a complicated (perhaps a comprehensive) competitive model (Stage 2) at the expense of a simple model (perhaps static) of coalition formation, or vice versa.
We have chosen the latter approach in this paper.
In doing so, we think we are one of the first papers to analyze dynamic alliances in a competitive model. Since analysis of dynamic alliance formation is relatively new, we use two concepts to predict the market structure and thus check the robustness of our results. This robust analysis, for instance,
shows that when markets are large, the grand coalition is not stable in a farsighted sense for certain values of discount rate. This concurs with the empirical evidence that one observes in cooperatives and other alliances in the natural products sector.
Perhaps equally important are two other observations that we make. First, we show a variation of the external stability property of the LCS. In our setting, we show that any outcome not in the LCS has to be indirectly dominated by a set of outcomes that we explicitly specify. In general, computing the members of the LCS can be a very tedious process. However, this result can potentially simplify the search. We believe that for games that possess a superadditive structure, even in the presence of infinite << chains one can prove a weaker version (as in Proposition 17) of external stability.
Second, the EPCF seeks to give a strict refinement of the LCS. Thus, it is theoretically important to know when such strict refinements are possible. In Theorem 19, we provide such an instance. Once again, using Proposition 13, we are able to find a discount rate such that the refinement is strict.
Interestingly, this refinement rules out the grand coalition. It is our hypothesis that in more general settings, property such as Proposition 13 can, in general, provide sufficient conditions for the refinement to be strict. This is beyond the scope of this paper.
There are several important and interesting extensions to this paper. First of all, the question bodes: How sensitive are the results to the specific model of competition? What would happen if the competition is modeled using a quantity game? These are important theoretical questions that need to be addressed. Our suspicion is that though the results in Stage 2 may be very specific to the competition, Stage 1 is quite robust and relies only on very general properties such as the super additive and complementary properties that alliance formations exhibit. This needs to be rigorously tested.
Finally, we assume that players are symmetric. In real instances, we concede that this is rarely the case. We do a very elementary analysis of asymmetric players. Asymmetry brings with it a host of modeling issues. When players are asymmetric, there is a very important issue that needs to be addressed. This involves the allocation of the joint surplus when such players form an alliance.
This issue is tricky and not straightforward, and simple allocation rules that one proposes need to be rigorously justified. This complicates the analysis and distracts us from the main objective of the paper.
The issues raised in the preceding paragraphs are doubtlessly very important. We hope that future research in this area addresses some of these questions. 
First note that
where the first inequality follows from p * C > p * C , and the second one from the definition of the NE. 4. It is easy to evaluate that, for any coalition member i,
Let us denote
G (k) = 4n 2 + 2αn(5n − 6k + 1) + α 2 (6n 2 − 12nk + n + 6k − 2), and G"(k) = −6α(2n + 2αn − α) ≤ 0, hence G(k) is concave in k. Furthermore, G(1) = 2αn(n − 1) + α 2 (n − 1)(2n − 1) ≥ 0, and G(n) = 4n 2 (n − 1) + 2αn(2n 2 − 3n + 1) ≥ 0, hence G(k) ≥ 0 for any k = 1, . . . , n. Thus, the RHS in (A2) is nonnegative, and i's profit increases in k.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Recall that the profit for a coalition member in the basic coalition structure Z n k increases with the size of the coalition. When n ≤ 4, (n − 1)/2 ≤ 3/2, hence the condition k ≤ (n − 1)/2 implies k = 1, which corresponds to the coalition structure where all players act independently. Thus, the statement of Proposition 7 for n ≤ 4 follows from Proposition 6. If we show that the statement holds for k = (n − 1)/2 when n ≥ 5 odd, the proof is complete. By using expressions (5) and (6) 
where K is positive for α > 0. It is easy to evaluate that the RHS of (A3) is positive for n ≥ 5 and α > 0, hence the statement of the Proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 9: First, we show that the grand coalition belongs to the LCS. Consider a deviation by an arbitrary coalition S ⊂ N , where S can consist of either 1 or 2 players, which leads to a coalition structure Z 3 S . Any such deviation can be followed by another deviation of all three players, Z 3 3 S Z 3 S 1,2,3 Z 3 3 . Clearly, it follows from (7) that Z 3 S ≺ S Z 3 3 for any S ⊂ N , while at the same This is true because Proposition 16 implies i+1 (A) ⊂ i (A)∀A, ∀ large n, and we are guaranteed W's existence becuse Z is finite.
Now we can show that if X ∈ Z\W, there is Y ∈ W such that (X , Y) ∈∼ W and that W ⊂ M (Z, ♦ W ). Using Tarski (1955) we can show that if f : 2 Z → 2 Z is defined as f (X) = {Z ∈ Z such that ∀V, S, such that Z S V, ∃B ∈ X, where V = B or V B, and Z ≺ S B}. For large n there is an α such that V ⊆ f (V) and thus V ⊆ LCS.
Proof of Theorem 18:
1. Let us suppose that the grand coalition, Z n n , belongs to the LCS. Observe that, for k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, any deviation from Z n n has the form Z n n n−k+1,...,n Z n n−k,k . Suppose that k ≥ n/2, and consider the following sequence of deviations: Z n n n−k+1,...,n Z n n−k,k n Z n n−k,k−1,1 . . . n−k+1 Z n n−k 1,...,n Z n n , where Z n n−k = {(12 . . . n − k), 1, . . . , 1}. Let Z = B = Z n n , V = Z n n−k,k , and S = {n − k + 1, . . . , n}. Now, it is true that Z n n−k,k = V B = Z n n , because: (a) Z n n−k,k ≺ n Z n n follows from the fact that the grand coalition realizes the highest total profit, and that a member of the larger coalition in Z n n−k,k realizes lower profit than a member of the smaller coalition; (b) Z n n−k,k−j,1,...,1 ≺ n−j−1 Z n n−k , for all j = 0, . . . , k − 1 follows from Corollary 15 and Proposition 5; (c) Z n n−k ≺ 1,...,n Z n n follows from Corollary 8, the fact that n − k ≤ n/2 for k ≥ n/2, and the fact that the profit for a coalition member in Z n j increases with the size of the coalition. In addition, Z n n = Z ≺ S B = Z n n . Note that, when k < n/2, the analysis still holds after replacing the deviation of players n − k + 1, . . . , n by a deviation of players 1, . . . , n − k. Thus, the grand coalition always belong to the LCS.
Prof of item 2 is similar to that of item 1 and is omitted due to space constraints. It can be obtained from the authors.
3. Consider the coalition structure Z n n−2,1,1 (and Z n n−3,1,1,1 ), where n − 2 (n − 3) players form a coalition, and the remaining two (three) players, say i and j (i, j, and k) remain independent. Using exactly the same analysis as in Proposition 12, we can show that there exists α 1 < α 2 < α(n) such that: Now consider all possible outcomes that are obtained by a single defection from Z n n−2,1,1 . They are: (i) Z n n−2,1,1 Z n n ; (ii) Z n n−2,1,1 Z n n−k,k ; (iii) Z n n−2,1,1 Z n n−k−l,k,l ; and (iv) Z n n−2,1,1 Z n n−k−l−1,k,l,1 . Note that (ii) and (iii) can be further divided into sub cases depending on whether either i or j are involved in the defection.
It is easy to show that (i) is deterred by considering the sequence Z n n−2,1,1 Z n n Z n n−2,1,1 . To prove (ii), we first show, exactly imitating the proof of Proposition 17, that there exists ψ > α 1 such that for α < min{ψ, α 2 } coalition outcome with exactly two coalitions that are not in the LCS is indirectly dominated by a basic coalition structure. This shows that (ii) is deterred. (iii) and (iv) can be shown exactly using chains as in (1) and (2). This proves part (3a). The proof of (3b) is similar and uses (b) and (c) above.
Proof of Theorem 19: Let |Z| = t, and let m and M be minimum and maximum single period payoffs to any player, respectively. Choose * ∈ (0, 1) such that for any two states X , Y, and any player i with 
